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Resumen:
Se ha defendido que en el debate contemporáneo sobre el escepticismo radical a propósito de nuestro conocimiento perceptivo del mundo
externo se pueden delinear dos formas de escepticismo radical. Si bien son similares superficialmente y puede parecer que produzcan el mismo
resultado escéptico, aquí argumentamos que estos tipos de escepticismo difieren fundamentalmente en términos del desafío que plantean a la
posibilidad del conocimiento perceptivo racionalmente fundamentado. Mientras que una de las formulaciones de escepticismo radical, que
resulta del principio de cierre, se ocupa de la aparente transitividad de las razones, la otra formulación, que resulta del principio de indeterminación
se ocupa de la aparente insularidad de las razones. Se defiende aquí que entender las diferencias entre estas dos formas de escepticismo radical
es clave para reconocer cómo dos variedades muy influyentes de anti-escepticismo que a menudo se caracterizan como competidoras –debido
a Wittgenstein y John McDowell- puede que deban reconsiderarse como de apoyo mutuo.
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Two conceptions of radical scepticism
Abstract:
It is argued that in the contemporary debate about radical scepticism regarding our perceptual knowledge of an external world one can delineate
two forms of radical scepticism. While superficially similar, and generating the same sceptical upshot, it is argued that they nonetheless
fundamentally differ in terms of the challenge they offer to the possibility of rationally grounded perceptual knowledge. Whereas the one
formulation of radical scepticism, which turns on the closure principle, concerns the apparent transitivity of reasons, the other formulation,
which turns on underdetermination principle, concerns the apparent insularity of reasons. It is argued that understanding the differences
between these two forms of radical scepticism is key to recognising how two influential varieties of anti-scepticism which are often characterised
as competing -due to Wittgenstein and John McDowell- might be instead reconceived as mutually-supporting.
Key words:
Closure Principle, Epistemology, Knowledge, McDowell, Radical Scepticism, Underdetermination Principle, Wittgenstein.
1. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF RADICAL SCEPTICISM
n the contemporary literature on radical scepticism
 about  our  perceptual  knowledge  of  the  external
 world, there tends to be two completely different
conceptions of radical scepticism in play, with discussions
of each running to a large degree orthogonal to one another.
While the first conception of radical scepticism makes
essential use of an ‘closure’ principle regarding the
knowledge-generating powers of competent deduction, the
second conception makes essential use of an
‘underdetermination’ thesis regarding the rational epistemic
standing afforded to us by perceptual experience.1
Despite their significant structural differences, the
two conceptions of radical scepticism both have some
important commonalities. For example, both conceptions
of radical scepticism appear to present us with a paradox,
in the sense that they expose a profound tension within our
own epistemological concepts, one that cannot be resolved
without denying some claim which is deeply intuitive.2
Moreover, both conceptions of radical scepticism also make
essential play with the notion of a radical sceptical
hypothesis, where this is a scenario subjectively
indistinguishable from a paradigm case of perception, but
where one is in fact massively deceived. For our purposes,
we can take the so-called ‘brain-in-a-vat’ (BIV) radical
1 Note that, for the sake of simplicity, I’m here bracketing contemporary treatments of Pyrrhonian scepticism. Even though there is a rich vein
of contemporary philosophical work on this problem, for reasons I have not the space to expound here it seems to me that it is a very different
kind of philosophical beast to the two forms of scepticism presently under discussion. For some representative recent work on Pyrrhonian
scepticism, see the papers collected in MACHUCA (2011).
2  See Stroud (1984) for a seminal contemporary discussion of the problem of radical scepticism qua paradox.
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sceptical scenario as representative, where this concerns
an agent who from her point of view reasonably supposes
herself to be in paradigm perceptual conditions, but who is
in fact not perceiving a world around her at all, her beliefs
being in response to fake ‘perceptual’ stimuli offered by
supercomputers wired up to her brain (which is floating,
disembodied, in a vat of nutrients).
With the BIV sceptical hypothesis in mind, let us
characterise our first, closure-based, conception of radical
scepticism. The initial plank in this case for scepticism is
that one cannot know that one is not a BIV. Such a claim
seems entirely compelling. After all, since the BIV scenario
is ex hypothesi subjectively indistinguishable from normal
perceptual conditions, it is hard to see how one might come
to know such a thing. What kind of rational basis might
one have for such a belief, for example, given that there is
no subjective basis on which one can discern that one is
not in a radical sceptical scenario?
We thus have (S11):
(S11) I cannot know that I am not a BIV.
The idea now is to demonstrate that this claim is in
tension with our conception of ourselves as perceptually
knowing a great deal about a world external to ourselves.
We can bring this out by considering a paradigmatic case
of perceptual knowledge, the kind of case of perceptual
knowledge such that, if one knows anything about the
external world, then one know this. In my case, for example,
this might be that I am presently sitting at my desk, typing
on my laptop computer:
(S13) I know that I am sitting at my desk.
On the face of it, of course, there is no immediate
tension between (S11) and (S13), in that there seems no
obvious reason why it cannot be the case both that one
lacks the knowledge at issue in (S11) and that one possesses
the knowledge at issue in (S13). This is where the closure
principle for knowledge comes in.
Various formulations of this principle have been
offered, but rather than review them all we will focus on
that formulation which is widely regarded to be the most
compelling (and thus the most difficult to deny):
The Closure Principle
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from
p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis
while retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows
that q.3
The basic idea behind the closure principle is that
competent deduction from known premises (and which
continue to be known) can generate knowledge of the
conclusion of this deduction. So stated, how could matters
be otherwise? That is, how could one draw a competent
deduction from one’s knowledge without thereby coming
to know the deduced conclusion?
But with the closure principle in play, and assuming
that our agent knows full well that the subject in the BIV
case can hardly be thought to be in any sense seated at a
desk (since the disembodied brain in question is floating), it
follows that if one did know that one were seated at a desk,
then one could, via closure, come to know that one was
not a BIV. Conversely, if one cannot know that one is not a
BIV, it follows that one does not¾indeed cannot¾know
that one is seated at a desk:
(S12) If one cannot know that one is not a BIV, then
one cannot know that one is seated at a desk.
The nub of the matter is that knowledge of something
so mundane as that one is seated at a desk, can lead, via
closure, to knowledge that one is not the victim of a sceptical
hypothesis, like the BIV hypothesis. Moreover, it ought to
be clear that the problem here is not the specific quotidian
proposition chosen to indicate one’s everyday knowledge
(i.e., that one is seated at one’s desk), since just about any
quotidian proposition which we typically take ourselves to
know will do (we would just need to vary the radical
sceptical hypothesis to suit).
What we have here is thus a putative paradox, in
that a series of claims which have been shown to either be
intuitive, or be immediate consequences from intuitive claims
(like the closure principle), are in fact in logical tension
with one another, such that one of them must be denied:
(S11) I cannot know that I am not a BIV.
(S12) f one cannot know that one is not a BIV, then
one cannot know that one is seated at a desk.
(S13) I know that I am seated at a desk.
Clearly, at least one of the claims that make up this
triad must be false, since they cannot all be true on pain of
contradiction. But given the intuitiveness of each claim,
this means that radical scepticism appears to call on us to
claim something deeply counterintuitive.
Compare this closure-based contemporary
conception of radical scepticism with one which instead
directly focuses, with one eye on radical sceptical scenarios,
on the paucity of the rational basis we have for our
perceptual beliefs in external world propositions. In
particular, according to ‘underdetermination’-based radical
scepticism, the sceptical problem facing our perceptual
knowledge of the external world does not turn on the closure
principle, but instead is a direct consequence of the fact
3 This is essentially the formulation of the closure principle put forward by Williamson (2000, p. 117) and Hawthorne (2005, p. 29).
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that the rational support provided by our perceptual
experiences does not epistemically favour our ordinary
perceptual beliefs over the kind of scenarios depicted by
radical sceptical hypotheses.
Let’s start with the claim that the rational support
we possess for our perceptual beliefs in external world
propositions is never such as to epistemically favour the
truth of these beliefs over radical sceptical alternatives. So,
for example, one’s rational basis right now for believing
that one is seated at one’s desk, no matter how epistemically
propitious the conditions for one’s belief in this regard, is
never such as to give one more reason to think that one is
seated at one’s desk than that one is a disembodied BIV
who merely falsely supposes that she is seated at her desk.
In short, one’s rational support for a perceptual belief is
underdetermined with respect to radical sceptical scenarios.
We can express this point as follows, using the quotidian
proposition that one is seated at one’s desk as representative
of an epistemically ‘best case’ of perceptual belief:
(S21) One does not have better rational support for
believing that one is seated at one’s desk than
that one is a disembodied BIV.
This claim seems undeniable. For given that the
experiences had by the subject in the BIV case are
subjectively indistinguishable from everyday experience,
then how is one to come by rational support for an everyday
perceptual belief which epistemically favours this belief over
a radical sceptical alternative?
As before, the challenge facing the sceptic is to show
that this claim is in tension with our everyday knowledge.
That is, the challenge is to show that (S21) is in tension
with a relevant claim about one’s paradigmatic perceptual
knowledge:
(S23) I know that I am seated at my desk.
How is this done? Well, as with the closure-based
radical sceptical argument, a general connecting principle
is required. Consider the following principle:
The Underdetermination Principle
If S knows that  p and q  are incompatible, and  yet
lacks a rational basis for preferring p over q, then S
lacks knowledge that p.4
This principle seems compelling, at least as regards
perceptual knowledge (which is what interest us here), and
insofar as one holds that perceptual knowledge must always
have a rational foundation. On the latter point, how could it
be that one has an adequate rational foundation for one’s
perceptual belief if one grants that it is incompatible with a
scenario which one cannot rationally exclude? Accordingly,
insofar as one holds that perceptual knowledge has a rational
foundation, then it seems that perceptual knowledge must
conform to this principle.
With the underdetermination principle in play, we can
now formulate our bridging claim between (S21) and (S23)
as follows:
(S22) If  one  lacks  a  rational basis which favours
one’s belief  that  one is seated at one’s desk
over the alternative BIV scenario, then one does
not know that one is seated at one’s desk.
(S22) is clearly a manifestation of the  underde-
termination principle, at least where we assume, as is
reasonable, that the subject in question knows full well that
being seated  and being a disembo died BIV are  incompatible
propositions. With (S22) and (S21) in play, however, the
logical tension with (S23) is clear:
(S21) One does not have better rational support for
believing that one is seated at one’s desk than
that one is a disembodied BIV.
(S22) If one  lacks  a  rational basis which favours
one’s  belief  that  one is seated at one’s desk
over the BIV scenario, then one does not know
that one is seated at one’s desk.
(S23) I know that I am seated at my desk.
As before, we have a putative paradox, in that we
have three claims which are either directly highly intuitive
or which rest on further claims which are highly intuitive,
but where not all of these three claims could be true together.
The challenge is thus to demonstrate which of these three
claims should be rejected.
There are various ways that one might respond to
the two sceptical challenges just set out. As regards the
closure-based sceptical challenge, for example, one might
reject the closure principle on which it depends, or else
argue that there is an epistemic basis on which one can
know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses.5 As regards
the underdetermination-based sceptical challenge, for
example, one might reject the underdetermination principle.6
4 Note that the incompatibility in play here is not one of contradiction, but rather concerns contraries. That is, it is not that p and q must be such
that if one of them is true then the other is false, but rather that p and q are incompatible in the sense that they cannot both be true. For a key recent
discussion of the underdetermination principle, see Brueckner (1994). See also Pritchard (2005a, part one; 2005b).
5  Famously, Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981) denied a version of the closure principle, though it is unclear whether their original grounds for
denying this principle carry over to the more nuanced formulation offered here. For a recent discussion of the merits of the closure principle, see
the exchange between Dretske (2005a; 2005b) and Hawthorne (2005). One style of anti-scepticism which involves arguing that we can know the
denials of radical sceptical hypotheses is neo-Mooreanism. See, for example, Sosa (1999) and Pritchard (2002b; 2005a). For a general overview
of the contemporary debate regarding radical scepticism, see Pritchard (2002a).
6 We will be considering a style of anti-scepticism which involves rejecting the underdetermination principle below.
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Moreover, one might further argue that whatever response
one offers to the one radical sceptical challenge can be
adapted to deal with the other radical sceptical challenge,
and present the further argumentation to buttress this claim.7
Rather than considering all the possible ways of
responding to these two styles of radical scepticism, I want
to instead try to diagnose just what it is about these
approaches to radical scepticism that make them distinct.
For while the ultimate sceptical-cum-paradoxical upshot
of these arguments is the same, and while they both make
use of radical sceptical hypotheses, they concern two very
different apparent limitations on the rational support we
have for our external world beliefs. In particular, I want to
suggest that while underdetermination-based radical
scepticism highlights what I will be calling the insularity of
this rational support, closure-based radical scepticism
concerns instead what I will be calling its transitivity.
2. THE INSULARITY AND TRANSITIVITY OF
REASONS
Let’s start with closure-based radical scepticism.
Given that this form of sceptical argument as described
above didn’t even mention reasons, we will need to do some
work to show that any general issue about the nature of
reasons is being exposed by this form of argument.
The connection to reasons can be brought about by
supposing that knowledge is, if not universally, then at least
typically, rationally grounded. That is, when one knows
one is in possession of a solid rational basis for the target
belief. Even epistemic externalists, who question the
necessity of rational support for knowledge, may well be
willing to grant that human knowledge at least is typically
rationally grounded in this way. But imagine now that one
has rationally grounded knowledge regarding some external
world proposition and one competently deduces, on this
basis, that one is not the victim of a sceptical scenario which
is incompatible with this external world proposition. Given
that competent deduction is itself a rational process, how
could one’s belief in the entailed proposition be any less
rationally grounded than the original belief in the entailing
proposition?
But even if we can make some sense of the idea
that, in some brute epistemic externalist fashion (e.g., by
having a belief which is reliably formed, or which meets
some other externalist epistemic condition, like the safety
principle), one could know the denial of a radical sceptical
hypothesis, it is hard to fathom how such knowledge can
be rationally grounded. Here we come up against the
apparent transitivity of reasons, in that it seems reasons
must transfer across competent deductions in this way,
even though it is hard to square this claim with the kind of
anti-sceptical inferences in play in this case.
In recasting the closure-based radical sceptical
argument in these terms, we are effectively appealing to a
slightly amended version of the closure principle, which
we can formulate as follows:
The Closure* Principle
If S has rationally supported knowledge that p, and
S  competently  deduces  from  p  that  q,  thereby
forming a belief that q on this basis  while  retaining
her  rationally  supported  knowledge that p, then S
has  knowledge  that  q  that  is  no  less  rationally
supported than her knowledge that p.
In a nutshell, while the closure principle ensures that
knowledge is generated by a competent deduction from a
known premise, the closure* principle ensures that rationally
supported knowledge is generated by a competent deduction
from a rationally supported premise. As noted above, the
latter claim, while more specific, is no less plausible. For
given that competent deduction is itself a paradigmatically
rational process, how could the knowledge that results from
such a deduction be any less rationally grounded than the
knowledge on which this deduction is based?
With the closure* principle in play, however, we can
re-run the closure-based radical sceptical argument set out
above to generate the more specific conclusion that we do
not have rationally grounded knowledge of a world external
to us. After all, if I did have rationally grounded knowledge
that I am sitting at my desk right now, then I could, via
closure*, come to have rationally grounded knowledge that
I am not a BIV. Since the latter is, it seems, unavailable, it
follows that I cannot have rationally grounded knowledge
that I am sitting at my desk right now (and, by parity of
reasoning, much else besides).8
Closure*-based radical scepticism thus exposes the
apparent sceptical consequences of the transitivity of
reasons, where this concerns the manner in which rational
7  This point depends on the logical connections between the two types of radical sceptical challenge. For the main recent discussions of this issue,
see Brueckner (1994), Cohen (1998), Pritchard (2005b; cf. Pritchard 2005a, part one).
8  In the contemporary literature the closure principle is often contrasted with the so-called ‘transmission’ principle -see, e.g., Davies (2004) and
Wright (2004)- and one might think that the latter is effectively identical with the closure* principle here formulated. There is a subtle difference,
however. For whereas the closure* principle merely demands that competent deductions from rationally grounded knowledge generate rationally
grounded knowledge, the transmission principle demands in addition that the very same rational basis for knowledge of the entailing proposition
should be a rational basis for the entailed claim. This is a more specific thesis. For our purposes, however, all that matters is that the subject’s
knowledge of the deduced proposition is no less rationally grounded, and we can bracket the issue of whether a particular rational basis has been
‘transmitted’ across the competent deduction. It could be, for example, that the competent deduction itself transforms the rational basis for the
agent’s knowledge of the entailing and entailed proposition. For more on this issue, see Pritchard (forthcominga).
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support for one’s knowledge appears to be preserved when
one extends one’s knowledge via competent deduction. In
contrast, underdetermination-based radical scepticism is
concerned with how the rational support we have for our
external world beliefs is troublingly weak, in that it does
not favour our quotidian beliefs over radical sceptical
alternatives. This is what I mean when I talk of
underdetermination-based radical scepticism exposing the
insularity of reasons.
That the rational support we have for our perceptual
beliefs is insular in this way is often taken to be a core
epistemological datum which requires explanation. Indeed,
it is the backbone of the so-called ‘new evil genius’ intuition.9
This can be summarised as the claim that the rational support
we have for our perceptual beliefs even in optimal perceptual
conditions can be no better than the rational support our
envatted counterpart (whose experiences are
indistinguishable from our own) has for her equivalent
beliefs, even though her beliefs are of course radically false.
The  rational  support we have for our perceptual beliefs
are thus insular to the degree that even in the best case they
are compatible with massive falsity in our external world
beliefs.
It should be clear that underdetermination-based
radical scepticism buys into the insularity of reasons thesis
without question. After all, the key element in this argument
is the effective granting of the new evil genius intuition, for
without this component one could not derive (S21) in the
first place, and the appeal to the underdetermination principle
in (S22) would be idle. Underdetermination-based radical
scepticism is thus essentially wedded to the insularity of
reasons thesis.
Although the ultimate sceptical import of the
transitivity and insularity of reasons is the same, it is
important to note that they pose distinct epistemological
challenges. Suppose, for example, that one rejected the
transitivity claim and argued that rational support, properly
conceived, does not transfer across competent deductions
in the fashion set out above. In this way, one could block
the closure*-based radical sceptical argument. It is far from
obvious how that would help one resolve the problem posed
by the insularity of reasons, however. That one can have
rationally grounded knowledge of mundane external world
propositions while lacking rationally grounded knowledge
in the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses is one thing;
that one can have adequately rationally grounded knowledge
of mundane external world propositions when that rational
basis is (one is aware) entirely compatible with the truth of
radical sceptical hypotheses quite another.
The same is true in the other logical direction, in that
merely denying the insularity of reasons does not appear to
guarantee you a satisfactory response to the sceptical
problem posed by the transitivity of reasons. For suppose
that one argues that one’s rational support can, in optimal
cases say, epistemically favour your everyday beliefs over
radical sceptical alternatives. The insularity thesis would
thus be rejected. But can one straightforwardly generate
on this basis a response to the sceptical problem posed by
the transitivity of reasons? Alas, no. For it is one thing to
say that one has better rational support for one’s knowledge
of everyday external world propositions than for radical
sceptical alternatives, and quite another to say that one has
rationally grounded knowledge that these sceptical
alternatives are false which is no less rationally grounded
than one’s knowledge of everyday external world
propositions. After all, we presumably wish to hold that
our knowledge of everyday external world propositions
enjoys an excellent rational basis. Is it plausible that our
beliefs in the denials of sceptical hypotheses could also enjoy
such an excellent rational basis? Put another way, it is
compatible with the denial of the insularity thesis that one
has a very weak rational basis for one’s knowledge of the
denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, and with the
transitivity thesis in play this would suffice to demonstrate
that we thereby have a very weak rational basis for our
knowledge of everyday external world propositions too,
thereby blunting somewhat the anti-sceptical import of
rejecting the insularity thesis.
The upshot of the foregoing is that a fully adequate
response to the problem of radical scepticism may well
need to be sensitive to the particular challenges posed by
both of the two formulations of this problem that we have
examined. As we will see in the next section, this conclusion
is potentially important in terms of our understanding of
two prominent styles of anti-scepticism which can appear
to be in competition with one another. In particular, it invites
the thought that these two responses to the problem of
radical scepticism may well be responding to different
versions of the radical sceptical challenge such that they
are on closer inspection mutually-supporting.
3. WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MCDOWELLIAN ANTI-
SCEPTICISM
We noted in the last section that the two forms of
radical scepticism we have set out trade on two distinctive
claims about reasons, and that denying any one of these
claims did not provide one with a straightforward route to
evading the form of radical scepticism which rested on the
other. Suppose, however, that one had the dialectical
resources to resist both claims about reasons, each on an
individually motivated basis, but where the two motivating
bases were nonetheless compatible with one another.
Wouldn’t this be an ideal way to deal with the sceptical
problem? Interestingly, I think such a dual response to the
9 The locus classicus in this regard is Lehrer & Cohen (1983).
ÁMBITOSI
REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y HUMANIDADES, núm. 28 (2012)
1 8
problem of radical scepticism is indeed available, at least so
long as we bring together two styles of anti-scepticism
which are often characterised as alternatives to one another,
and which are certainly very different. These two styles of
anti-scepticism are those credited to the later Wittgenstein
(1969) and to John McDowell (e.g., 1995). We will take
them in turn.
One of the guiding ideas of Wittgenstein’s final
notebooks, published as On Certainty (Wittgenstein 1969),
is that we should recognise the essential locality of rational
support, where this means that the very idea of a fully general
rational evaluation of our beliefs, whether positive (as in an
anti-sceptical evaluation) or negative (as in a radical sceptical
evaluation) is simply incoherent. Wittgenstein argues instead
that all rational evaluation, as a matter of logic, presupposes
certain arational «hinge» commitments which cannot
themselves be rationally assessed (as it is these commitments
which enable rational evaluations to occur in the first place).
As he famously put the point:
«[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts
depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt
from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific
investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.
But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just
can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are
forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door
to turn, the hinges must stay put.» (Wittgenstein 1969,
§§341-3).
It follows that the rational support we have for our
beliefs is essentially local, in the sense that we cannot extend
this rational support from our everyday beliefs to other
beliefs via competent deduction without restriction. In
particular, we cannot, through competent deduction, gain
rationally grounded knowledge of the hinge commitments
relative to which we have rationally grounded knowledge
of everyday propositions. Wittgenstein is thus rejecting the
transitivity of reasons, and in doing so is specifically
attacking the closure*-based radical scepticism which
exploits this thesis.10
In contrast, the McDowellian form of anti-scepticism
that we are interested in is not concerned with the
transitivity of reasons but rather the potential for perceptual
reasons to be world-involving in a sense which excludes
underdetermination-based scepticism. That is, McDowell
advances a form of epistemological disjunctivism on which
the rational support one enjoys for one’s perceptual beliefs
in paradigm cases of perception is far superior to the rational
suppose one enjoys for one’s perceptual beliefs in
corresponding (and subjectively indistinguishable) cases of
radical deception. McDowell thus denies outright the new
evil genius intuition. Such a proposal is directly in opposition
to the underdetermination principle and the insularity of
reasons thesis on which this principle turns.
In particular, according to this form of
epistemological disjunctivism, one’s rational support for
believing an external world proposition in paradigm
conditions can be that one sees that such-and-such is the
case. So one’s rational support for believing that there is a
cup in one’s hand in suitable conditions can be that one
sees that there is a cup in one’s hand. Seeing that p entails
p, however, so one thereby has a rational support for one’s
external world belief which excludes radical sceptical
hypotheses in a fairly immediate fashion. If one sees that
there is a cup in one’s hand, then there is a cup in one’s
hand, and hence one is not a (handless) brain-in-a-vat who
merely thinks that he has a cup in his hand.11
Given how different these treatments of radical
scepticism are, it is tempting to think that they must be
competing responses to this philosophical difficulty. But
by disentangling the two types of radical scepticism in play
here, and by disentangling how these two formulations of
radical scepticism effectively trade on distinct claims about
the nature of reasons, it ought to be clear that one does not
have to regard them as such. Indeed, I want to close by
tentatively suggesting that these two anti-sceptical theses
are in fact mutually-supporting.
Take first the Wittgensteinian response to the problem
of radical scepticism. The big difficulty that this response
faces is that it seems to accentuate rather than resolve the
problem in play. We wanted to know what our rational
basis for our knowledge was, and to be told that this rational
basis ultimately trades on essentially arational hinge
commitments, such that the rational support our beliefs
enjoy is essentially local, can easily sound like a capitulation
to radical scepticism rather than a response to it. We can
bring this point into sharper relief by considering how the
Wittgensteinian response to radical scepticism deals with
underdetermination-based radical scepticism. For how does
saying that the rational support we have for our beliefs is
essentially local offer a response to this form of radical
scepticism? The short answer is that it simply doesn’t. If
anything, to say that such rational support is inherently
local simply invites the further underdetermination-based
sceptical challenge.
10 Whether the Wittgensteinian position is committed to denying the closure* principle is a moot point, as I explain in Pritchard (2011a;
forthcominga; forthcomingb). In particular, if one interprets this proposal as claiming that we cannot even be thought to have beliefs in hinge
propositions, much less beliefs in these propositions acquired through a rational basis, then one can argue that one’s lacking a rational basis for
believing the hinge propositions is not in tension with the closure* principle (which demands that one’s belief in the entailed proposition be the
product of the rational process of competent deduction). For more on Wittgenstein’s approach to radical scepticism in On Certainty, see McGinn
(1989), Williams (1991), Stroll (1994), Moyal-Sharrock (2004), and Coliva (2010). For a survey, see Pritchard (2011b; cf. Pritchard 2005b).
11 I offer a book-length defence of this form of epistemological disjunctivism in Pritchard (2012). See also Pritchard (2008).
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But suppose one combined the Wittgensteinian claim
that rational support is essentially local with the McDowellian
rejection of the underdetermination thesis, such that the
rational support one has for one’s perceptual beliefs in
epistemically good conditions can be factive. Wouldn’t this
go some way towards removing the concern that the
Wittgensteinian response to the sceptical problem concedes
too much? Moreover, notice that one would have a response
to radical scepticism which dealt with both formulations.
Similarly, the McDowellian response to radical
scepticism can be strengthened by combining it with the
Wittgensteinian response. The McDowellian view offers
one a direct response to the underdetermination-based radical
scepticism argument by straightforwardly rejecting the
insularity of reasons thesis which is motivating it. But if
one now applies the McDowellian proposal to the closure*-
based radical sceptical argument the view seems to be
committed to the heroic claim not just that we have better
rational support for our perceptual beliefs in suitable
conditions than for their sceptical alternatives, but that we
can have knowledge that radical sceptical hypotheses are
false which is no less rationally grounded than our everyday
perceptual knowledge (which, recall, is based on factive
reasons on this view). Insofar as the proposal has this
consequence it will jar with our intellectual sensibilities. Can
our rational basis for excluding radical sceptical hypotheses
really be this robust?
If one combines the McDowellian proposal with the
Wittgensteinian proposal, however, then one need not take
this heroic route. One can instead claim that the factivity of
reasons need not have the consequence that our hinge
commitments are ever the subject of rationally grounded
knowledge, on account of the essential locality of reasons.
In short, just as in holding that reasons are essentially local
one can still nonetheless claim that they can be factive; so
in holding that reasons can be factive one can still
nonetheless claim that they are essentially local.
Of course, I haven’t offered anything like a full
defence of the compatibility of these two anti-sceptical
theses, much less have I demonstrated that they are
mutually supporting in the final analysis. But the foregoing
should suffice to show that there is an anti-sceptical
possibility available here which demands further scrutiny.
Furthermore, what is key to showing this is to recognise
that there are two distinct formulations of radical scepticism
in play in the contemporary debate, which turn on two
distinct conceptions of the nature, and limitations, of
reasons.12
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